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Post Humanism
Not life, but bad literature
In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams recounts that colleagues often
ask why he analyses literary texts – why can’t he use examples from “real
life”? He responds that “it is a perfectly good question, and it has a short
answer: what philosophers will lay before themselves and their readers as
an alternative to literature will not be life, but bad literature.”  This
anecdote contains an argument that would be readily embraced by any
proponent of “post-structuralism.” Namely, it suggests that no theory can
solely be based on reason. Any rational account needs an – acknowledged
or repressed – fictional support. We do not rely on pure concepts but
rather on conceptual fictions.
However, it would be too easy to stop at the idea of a conceptual fiction. We
also need to ask what is presupposed in demanding an example from
“real life.” I contend that the such a demand is Kantian because of the
operation within it of the concept of immediacy as it is found in Kant’s
moral philosophy.
In order to clarify my point, it would be best to preempt some confusion.
The notion of immediacy has been dominated by Hegel’s use of the term.
Immediacy or life experience in Hegel is the first step of the dialectic. This
enables the link of the particular (the immediate) to the universal through
mediation. This means that the immediate or “real life” is sublated into a
higher order. From this perspective, immediacy is deficient. To call for
examples from immediate experience or “real life” does not make sense
from a Hegelian perspective unless these examples are accompanied by
the mediation that sets in motion the dialectical machine.
Conversely, the notion of immediacy plays a crucial and positive role in
Kant’s moral philosophy. There are at least two, closely linked notions of
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immediacy in Kant’s idea of morality. On the one hand, the human can
only ever become conscious of the moral immediately. This means that
humans can never come to know the content of the moral law as such.
The moral law in Kant is formal. On the other hand, the moral law dictates
actions immediately: “The practical rule is … unconditional and so is
represented a priori as a categorical practical proposition by which the
will is objectively determined absolutely and immediately. … For, pure
reason, practical of itself, is here immediately lawgiving.”  In other words,
it is not a matter of choice to be determined by the moral law, since it is
“practical of itself” and hence determines us “immediately.”
Both in Hegel and in Kant, we can understand immediacy in terms of the
relation between the particular and the universal, and yet the meaning
and implications of immediacy are radically different. In Hegel the
particular is the immediate and hence immediacy also requires mediation,
whereas in Kant the immediate is both that which enables the human in
its particularity to become conscious of morality’s universality and also
allows the universal moral law to influence particular human actions. Thus,
immediacy for Hegel is prior to the connecting the particular and the
universal, whereas immediacy for Kant forges that connection itself.
It is the Kantian assumption of such a connection that justifies the
question: “why do you choose examples from real life?” From the Kantian
perspectives, this question essentially asks: “Since morality relies on its
immediate connection to real life, turning to literature robs philosophical
inquiry from any moral valence.” And Bernard William’s response means:
“The connection between the particular and the universal is always
mediated by literature, which means that interpretation is always
necessary. Immediacy cannot do away from the necessity of reading.”
Thus, the post-structuralist insight about the fictional ballast in concepts
also requires the activity of reading and interpretation in order to counter
Kantian immediacy.
The countering of the Kantian assumption about immediacy can be
expressed in positive terms as well. Reading and interpretation are never
possible in isolation. They are, rather, activities – they are labour – that
connects the subject in relations with others. An interpretation does not
contain a hidden message for the interpreter. A reading practice is
political in the sense that it links at least two people, the person who
generates a text and the person who reads and interprets that text. From
this perspective, countering immediacy opens up a conception of the
political that relies on praxis. Praxis here does not simply mean the
engagement in political parties, activism, and so on. Rather, it denotes the
labour to show the impossibility of the direct link between particularity
and universality. We can delineate this praxis by focussing on four
registers.
First, there is a political register. The entire discourse of sovereignty as
exceptional requires an immediate connection between the particular
circumstances that pose a threat to the state and the extralegal
prerogative of the sovereign, which is justified beyond particularity. The
sovereign decides on the exception, as Carl Schmitt avers, because of this
immediate connection. In this discourse, the sovereign is the figure that
denotes the immediate connection be-tween the situation and the
transcendent qualities of order, peace and stability that regulate the
discourse that affords the sovereign extralegal powers. How can we
construct a politics that resists sovereignty? As I have argued in
Sovereignty and Its Other, this is possible by developing a notion of
The Cave: An Adaptation of Plato's
Allegory in Clay
more about...
Book Reviews
Competitions
Environment
Film Review
Happiness
Ideas to change your life
Illusions
Literature & Writing
Off the grid
Opinion
Philosophy and you
Psychology
Society & Culture
Not life, but bad literature | New Philosopher http://www.newphilosopher.com/articles/not-life-but-bad-literature/
2 of 5 8/06/2013 9:24 PM
democracy that is not deceived by the narratives of emergency and
exceptionality – in other words, a democratic praxis that is attuned to the
necessity of interpretation.
Second, there is a linguistic register. The invitation to counter immediacy
does not mean that every action or thought is ipso facto political. Rather,
it means that they contain the potential to counter the force of immediacy.
Differently put, every action or thought can be understood in terms of
language and thus to be subjected to the mediacy of interpretation.
Nietzsche sug-gests in the third essay of the Genealogy of Morality that
religion thrives because it can con-sole through the generation of
meaning. But this meaning always refers to a transcendent register that is
itself beyond language. How can we generate meaning without recourse to
such a beyond? The figure of Nietzsche’s dancing Zarathustra suggests
that it is possible by constructing a language of joy.
Third, there is an ethical register. If immediacy for Kant describes the
connection to the moral realm, and if the dispensation of morality is one’s
duty, then duty becomes the spectre that haunts any human action. How
can one counter this conception of duty that links immediately a universal
moral law to experience? This question designates a task that is ethical in
the sense that Deleuze distinguishes ethics from morality, namely, as a
praxis that does not justify itself with recourse to something that is
transcendent.
Finally, we can identify an ontological register. This register can be
approached by focussing on the subject’s experience. Experience is linked
immediately to morality that in turn opens up a moral kingdom that
refers not to the human in their particularity, but to humanity in general.
This intrusion into the subject’s experience places the identity of the
questioner in peril, since it challenges the extent to which one can say
that they own their experience. This threat shows that being and
transcendence are not simply separated in order to be immediately
re-connected. Instead of immediacy, we can think of experience in terms of
singularity. What matters in singularity is not to secure a stable identity
but rather the operative presence of subjectivity in the continuous and
undecidable interplay between particularity and universality.
We need literature in order to be able to pose the question: immediacy or
praxis? The stakes are clear. We can either leave unquestioned the
immediate link between particularity and universality. Or we can insist on
interpretation as the praxis that aspires to a democratic politics. Taking
sides in this dilemma is not simply a matter of choosing between good
and bad literature, as Williams suggests to tease his interlocutors.
Moreover, it signifies a choice about our political commitments, which
determines who we live our lives.
This is an article from issue one of New Philosopher magazine. To read
all the articles grab a copy of the 132-page launch issue by subscribing
now.
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